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Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts

Thursday, December 27, 2012

Indonesia's Islamic spirit of tolerance

Writing at Secular Right, Andrew Stuttaford quotes Barack Obama on Indonesia:
Those things that I learned to love about Indonesia — that spirit of tolerance that is written into your constitution, symbolized in your mosques and churches and temples standing alongside each other; that spirit that is embodied in your people — that still lives on.
When evaluating flattering fluff like this, my instinct is to try and quantifiably evaluate how much truth, if any, it contains. When the subject is international in scope, the World Values Survey, imperfect and eccentric though it may be, is one of the best places to turn. In the most recent wave spanning the years 2005-2008, it asked respondents in several countries how much they trust people of a different religion than their own. There were four possible responses. I've assigned them scores of 3, 2, 1, and 0 for "trust completely", "trust a little", "trust not very much", and "not trust at all", respectively, to create a simple trust index that shows each country's mean score:

CountryTolerance
1. Sweden2.03
2. New Zealand2.01
3. France1.99
4. Norway1.90
5. Great Britain1.87
6. Mali*1.85
7. Finland1.85
8. United States1.81
9. Canada1.80
10. Australia1.74
11. Switzerland1.72
12. Andorra1.71
13. South Africa1.70
14. Rwanda1.67
15. Argentina1.63
16. Trinidad and Tobago1.60
17. Burkina Faso1.55
18. Uruguay1.52
19. Ghana1.50
20. Taiwan1.42
21. Serbia1.41
22. Poland1.40
23. Brazil1.40
24. Netherlands1.38
25. Spain1.37
26. India1.36
27. Ethiopia1.36
28. South Korea1.35
29. Bulgaria1.35
30. Indonesia1.32
31. Georgia1.31
32. Germany1.30
33. Ukraine1.27
34. Zambia1.26
35. Italy1.26
36. Malaysia1.23
37. Chile1.21
38. Egypt1.21
39. Thailand1.16
40. Colombia1.15
41. Russia1.15
42. Vietnam1.15
43. Slovenia1.11
44. Romania1.10
45. Jordan1.05
46. Mexico1.02
47. Turkey1.01
48. Cyprus1.00
49. Moldova0.98
50. Morocco0.91
51. Peru0.89
52. China0.89

Coming in at 30 of 52 countries, Indonesia is rather middling in terms of attitudinal religious tolerance. It does better than four (or possibly five) of the six other Muslim countries on the list--Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. *The data on Mali may have been transcribed backwards. If so, it should be placed in the company of Russia and Vietnam, which means Indonesia deserves its designation as a "moderate Muslim" country. The Mali data may be correct, on the other hand, as its responses are similar to those reported in Burkina Faso, a country that is 60% Muslim. When dealing with reliable data on Africa, a healthy dose of skepticism is always in order.

All religions are not created equal, however, and Indonesia comes in well below the Anglophone (read Christian and post-Christian) nations. By the standards Obama has grown up observing, Indonesian attitudes can hardly be said to foster a "spirit of tolerance".

Parenthetically, the Han Chinese are nationalistic, a substantial number of Germans agree with Thilo Sarrazin, Sweden is the most tolerant place in the universe, and some values do indeed stop at the Rio Grande.

WVS variables used: V129

Monday, October 29, 2012

As well aware of public sentiment as I like to think I am, I'm not impervious to the occasional surprise, this one of the pleasant variety. The following graphic comes from Pew Research's recent report on how Americans feel about our involvement in the Middle East and North Africa generally and the 'Arab Spring' in particular:


Quite encouraging. Americans were instinctively skeptical of the uprisings as the numbers from the beginning as the March/April 2011 show--pluralities thought they would "not lead to lasting improvements" and would "be bad for the United States" and an outright majority, in defiance of neocons and the interventionist left, expressed a preference for stable governments over democratically formed ones in the Arab world. Since then, these "America First" positions have only become firmer.

Further, the Republican electorate appears to have lost some of the enthusiasm for preaching messianic democracy with the aim of remaking the rest of the world in our own image over the last decade:


 That shouldn't be oversold, though:


The GOP has long way to go before it's the party of Rand Paul, but the country is inching in his direction. I'll gladly take evidence that the ratchet doesn't have to inexorably move in just one direction all the time where I can get it.

Welcome news as this may be, however, it's disheartening that most Americans don't have a presidential candidate from either of the major parties who shares their sentiments on our nation's relations with Muslim countries.

Saturday, June 23, 2012

Liberalism rankings by country

Expanding on the idea from a previous post showing that America's Religious Right is more permissive than moderate Muslims throughout the Islamic world are, I'll take a stab at sorting countries by attitudes on social issues.

The formula is simple. The WVS asks a series of questions on the justifiability of several different actions and behaviors. Taking the mean responses to the queries on homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide, and wife beating (inverted)--all on a 10-point scale--and then averaging those, we get a liberalism index score for each country. The higher the score, the more permissive* the inhabitants of the country are. All countries that participated in the fifth wave of the survey, conducted between 2005-2008, for which data on all seven actions and behaviors are available are included with the exception of poor, corrupted Slovenia:

CountryLiberalism
1. Andorra6.9
2. Sweden6.7
3. Switzerland6.2
4. Netherlands6.1
5. Norway6.1
6. France5.9
7. Spain5.7
8. Australia5.7
9. Germany5.5
10. Great Britain5.5
11. Finland5.4
12. Uruguay5.3
13. Canada5.1
14. Japan4.9
15. Bulgaria4.9
16. United States4.8
17. Argentina4.7
18. Serbia4.6
19. Taiwan4.4
20. Mexico4.4
21. Chile4.4
22. Russia4.2
23. Cyprus4.1
24. South Korea4.1
25. Brazil4.0
25. Italy4.0
27. Ukraine4.0
28. Poland3.8
29. India3.8
30. Mali3.6
30. Moldova3.6
32. Zambia3.6
33. Colombia3.5
34. Malaysia3.5
35. South Africa3.5
36. Thailand3.4
37. Romania3.4
38. Trinidad and Tobago3.1
39. Turkey3.0
40. Vietnam3.0
41. Ghana2.9
42. Burkina Faso2.9
42. China2.9
44. Iran2.9
45. Georgia2.8
46. Ethiopia2.8
47. Indonesia2.6
48. Rwanda2.5
49. Jordan2.2

The Occident occupies all the top spots, especially its Northwestern European contingent. The US is a bit more conservative than Northwestern Europe is, but more permissive than some places on the Old Continent are and way more so than most of the rest of the world is. Catholic Italy and Poland are more in line with the more open places in Central Europe and South America. South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East populate the socially conservative bottom of the list. The East Asian progression, with Japan as the most liberalized, with South Korea following several notches below and China quite a bit farther down than that, meshes well with the idea that as a country becomes more industrialized and developed, it becomes less patriarchal.

Speaking of the patriarchy, let's revisit a subject dealt with by Steve Sailer in his famous article The Return of Patriarchy? and add another data point suggesting that the kinds of conservative Steve prefers aren't the ones who are doing their best to inherit the earth. The correlation between the liberalism index and total fertility rate is an inverse .41 (p = 0)--a moderate relationship, but perhaps a deceptively modest one on account of old Soviet countries getting on board with the free world when it comes to staying out of the birthing ward, but not when it comes to accepting buggery or refraining from hitting one's wife.

WVS variables used: V202, V203, V204, V205, V206, V207, V208

* Dan H. made a good point regarding the slate of actions and behaviors being examined, namely that they are Eurocentric (because societies of European descent are really the only ones with both the interest and wherewithal to carry these sorts of surveys out):
These are softball questions for the Muslim societies. The real questions that show how illiberal many Muslims really are, are not even asked in the World Values Survey.
Questions such as: should someone face death for leaving the faith (Islam or Christianity, respectively)?
Results you get are 76% in Pakistan, 84% in Egypt and 86% in Jordan, three illiberal countries.
...
In America I have lived 33 years and interacted with tens of thousands in my lifetime and never known of anyone who believed in death as punishment for leaving the faith.
By this measure, ~80% of Muslims are less liberal than the most illiberal American. The most illiberal Christian I can think of Terry Jones, the illiberal pastor in Florida, has not gone as far as 80% of Muslims.

Monday, May 7, 2012

Addressing the oft made assertion (or at least insinuation) "that conservative American Protestants are roughly equivalent with conservative Muslims", Razib tapped the World Values Survey to compare the positions of conservative Protestants in the US with those of Muslims in predominately Islamic countries on some representative social issues. He presents a table that shows all scaled response distributions for each group on each question.

Below, I essentially replicate his results with the purpose of trying to reproduce them in a way that is a little easier for mere mortals like myself to digest. Instead of showing the entire distribution, I use mean values for each group. Razib concludes:
The general qualitative result: American conservative Protestants are in the main to the center or social liberal end of Muslim public opinion. They are not comparable at all to Muslim reactionaries.
As the averages make clearer, conservative Protestants (defined here as those who expressed a preference for the Republican party) are in fact more liberal on each of these issues than Muslims in any of the countries included are. Keep in mind, the comparison here is between conservative Protestants and all Muslims, not just between evangelicals and reactionary Islamists. The latter comparison would show conservative Protestants to be even more liberal relative to Muslims than this comparison does.

Finally, using standard deviation values reported in the WVS, each of the tables also shows where the average conservative Protestant fits into the Muslim distribution*. So, on the question of the justifiability of homosexuality, the average conservative American Protestant is at 71st percentile of the Muslim population. Because the wife-beating question is inverted, the figure shows where the average conservative Protestant falls on the another-black-eye-to-explain-to-the-neighbors-is-unjustifiable distribution. The higher the value (on a 1-10 scale), the more justifiable the act or behavior in question is viewed as being:

HomosexualityScore
Conservative Protestants (US)3.2
Malaysia (Muslim)2.9
Jordan (Muslim)1.0
Iran (Shia)1.5
Turkey (Muslim)1.7
Conservative Protestant percentile among Muslims71st percentile


AbortionScore
Conservative Protestants (US)3.5
Malaysia (Muslim)2.8
Iraq (Shia)1.2
Iraq (Sunni)2.4
Jordan (Muslim)1.2
Iran (Shia)2.3
Morocco (Muslim)1.8
Turkey (Muslim)2.3
Conservative Protestant percentile among Muslims73rd percentile


Man to beat his wifeScore
Conservative Protestants (US)1.3
Malaysia (Muslim)3.1
Jordan (Muslim)1.5
Iran (Shia)1.8
Morocco (Muslim)2.3
Turkey (Muslim)1.5
Conservative Protestant percentile among Muslims63rd percentile

WVS variables used: V185, V231(Republican), V202, V204, V208

* Arrived at by simply averaging the averages of each of the Muslim groups on each question. This skews Muslim opinion towards that of the Middle East and North Africa and away from South Asia, which, in terms of sheer numbers, is unrepresentative of the world's roughly 1.6 billion Muslims. Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh all have far more Muslims than any of the MENA countries do, but with the exception of Pakistan, when Americans think of Muslims, they primarily have Arabs and Persians in mind.

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

In the comments to a previous post looking at changes in positions on social behaviors over time across several countries participating in the WVS, Ed Tom Kowalsky wrote:
I wonder if one could similarly track global views on immigration, religion, crime (in general) and the United States.
I thought we'd be 2 for 4, but it turns out the question on immigration policy wasn't asked in the survey's earlier years, so religion is the only additional variable the WVS provides insight into on this front. Ah well, .250 isn't terrible in baseball, so we won't complain about the survey's restrictions too much.

Parenthetically, one question related to perceptions of the United States was posed to Iraqis in the fifth wave (2005-2008) asking how much confidence they had in American troops. A staggering 88% responded with "none at all" (n = 2,577). That's what our blood, sweat, and tears got us. Awesome!

There are 26 countries that participated in the WVS during both the 1990-1991 and 2005-2008 periods, but Argentina is excluded because the question about the importance of religion in the respondent's life was not asked in the earlier take and Slovenia is excluded because the data for that country are apparently corrupt.

In the following table, a religious importance index is computed for the countries listed based on respondents' answers to the question asking how important religion is in their lives. There are four possible responses, ranging from "very important" to "not at all important". The former is assigned a multiplier of 3, the latter of 0, the "somewhat important" response of 2, and the "not too important" of 1. The percentages of respondents giving each answer are then multiplied correspondingly, and the total for each country is divided by 3 to create an index scale of 0-100, with 0 indicating that the entire population says religion is not at all important, and a 100 indicating that the entire population says it is very important.

Religious importance index scores are shown for both periods, and the column furthest to the right shows the change in score from the end of the Cold War to today:

Religious importance90-9105-08Change
Brazil78.879.60.8
Bulgaria34.350.916.6
Canada59.758.5(1.2)
Chile74.668.4(6.2)
China
9.127.218.0
Finland43.549.56.0
France42.441.8(0.6)
Great Britain47.2
45.4(1.8)
India74.775.60.8
Italy
64.667.93.3
Japan31.227.1(4.1)
Mexico
66.380.213.9
Netherlands45.734.6(11.0)
Norway44.739.1(5.6)
Poland79.277.3(2.0)
Romania69.982.112.2
Russia37.247.910.8
South Africa83.685.92.3
South Korea55.849.9(5.9)
Spain49.741.4(8.3)
Sweden34.436.31.9
Switzerland54.146.6(7.5)
Turkey70.187.817.8
United States
76.0
70.1
(5.9)

Without pretending to be an amateur historian, the shifts over time initially to appear to be pretty straightforward to me. In the former Soviet Union, people had lived for four decades in a society in which the elimination of religion was an official state goal and every good citizen claimed to be an atheist. Religious property was confiscated and the orthodox church was subjugated. It's not surprising that as the iron curtain was lifted and the masses were free to rediscover religion again, it made a comeback. The uptick in religious importance in China over the 15 year period presumably has a similar though less rigid explanation, as the mainland is now comparable to Japan in its self-described religiosity.

In the table above, Turkey's results also tracks well with that country's recent history. Ataturk's republic was to be a secular one, and through most of the last century, Turkey has consistently been described as the most modern, moderate Islamic country in the MENA. More recently though, Turkey has been becoming more accommodating towards pious Muslim sensibilities. Erdogan, prime minister since 2003, has overseen a shift away from secularism in the country. That's what Western media report anyway, and the WVS lends credence to it.

Hindus are holding the line. Good for them.

So are South Africans. Running a few more of those unbelieving Dutch devils out since apartheid ended couldn't have hurt the cause!

The US, along with Catholic Poland and to a lesser extent Italy, are still far more overtly religious than the rest of western Europe is, with Canada falling in between, but in the Occident and its offshoots, the story has been one of gentle and steady decline at roughly equal rates across countries.

Being a good American, I don't know much about the cultural happenings in distant Mexico, choosing instead to focus my attention on places that are of greater relevance to me like Israel and Afghanistan. Consequently, the fairly substantial increase in religious importance to my south isn't something I'm easily able to account for. I think the ruling National Action party is more socially conservative and religious than the other two major parties in Mexico are, and it's held the presidency since 2000, so maybe the two are related. Or perhaps the increasing violence and instability that has characterized the country over the last several years as its government fights with drug cartels has pushed people towards greater spirituality, as I think Agnostic would predict.

WVS variables used: V9, V146ZA

Tuesday, January 31, 2012

A recent episode of NPR's Talk of the Nation focused on the consequences of the "Arab Spring" one year out. In response to a caller's question about how the overthrow of ruling regimes has affected women's rights, a correspondent in Egypt replies:
I think it's an extremely important question [AE: I wish reporters like this Garcia-Navarro would be asked why, exactly, is a question like this "extremely important"? Surely there are many other potential consequences of the 'Arab Spring' that are of greater importance to the West than this one is.], and I think, you know, it depends on which country you're looking at, but across the board I think many women who were involved in the revolution, certainly in Libya, certainly in Egypt, they do feel that they - that it hasn't necessarily empowered them.
For one, the "women who were involved in the revolution" don't appear to have much influence over what is replacing the regimes they helped topple:
The tally, with the two groups of Islamists together winning about 70 percent of the seats, indicates the deep cultural conservatism of the Egyptian public, which is expressing its will through free and fair elections for the first time in more than six decades. ...

A coalition of parties founded by the young leaders of the revolt that unseated Mr. Mubarak won only a few percent of the seats.

Upon news of the Egyptian parliamentary elections, Razib wrote:

Back in the heady days of the Arab Spring some commenters infected by revolutionary fervor would scoff at the purported Islamist sympathies of the people. What this goes to show is that enthusiasm and hope does not translate into reality. If secular liberals in Egypt bow before the principle of popularity, then they accept that it is right and proper that they present their throats to their new overlords. I don’t view this as an apocalypse. It is what it is. But it was predictable.
As are, I suspect, the prospects in Egypt and other Arab Spring countries for what in the Western worldview constitutes women's rights. The WVS probes respondents in participating countries about their feelings on multiple indicators of Western conceptions of women's rights. The following tables show responses from select Western nations and Muslim countries, and to provide a miscellaneous angle, Japan, collected from 2005-2008 (with the exception of the Egyptian response to the question on abortion, which was collected in 2000):

Agree that when jobs are scare, men should
have more right to them than women
Men
Women
United States
8.0%
5.6%
Great Britain
18.2%
14.4%
Canada
14.1%
14.4%
Germany
19.5%
16.3%
France
16.2%
19.8%
Japan
28.7%
25.8%
Malaysia
59.4%
38.7%
Turkey
58.8%
47.7%
Iran
75.1%
63.6%
Iraq
87.4%
80.6%
Egypt
93.1%
84.9%

Men make better business executives
than women do
Men
Women
United States
21.4%
11.7%
Great Britain
25.0%
9.5%
Canada
13.5%
9.4%
Germany
23.9%
10.2%
France
18.4%
10.5%
Japan
45.2%
29.0%
Malaysia
66.5%
42.6%
Turkey
59.5%
47.9%
Iran
85.6%
71.6%
Iraq
n/a
n/a
Egypt
89.2%
82.1%

Men make better political leaders
than women do
Men
Women
United States
27.2%
22.3%
Great Britain
26.2%
13.9%
Canada
20.5%
16.4%
Germany
25.2%
12.9%
France
24.3%
18.3%
Japan
51.9%
37.7%
Malaysia
77.4%
59.2%
Turkey
66.5%
56.2%
Iran
85.3%
71.9%
Iraq
92.2%
88.1%
Egypt
94.7%
90.1%

Approve of single motherhood
Men
Women
United States
49.0%
55.1%
Great Britain
28.9%
37.7%
Canada
44.0%
48.7%
Germany
33.3%
38.3%
France
59.6%
64.8%
Japan
20.6%
22.3%
Malaysia
16.9%
18.0%
Turkey
9.0%
8.0%
Iran
3.0%
2.3%
Iraq
n/an/a
Egypt
1.5%
2.0%

University is more important for
a boy than for a girl
Men
Women
United States
11.4%
4.5%
Great Britain
9.4%
4.5%
Canada
5.6%
4.3%
Germany
19.7%
10.2%
France
8.3%
5.3%
Japan
31.0%
18.8%
Malaysia
56.3%
36.1%
Turkey
22.3%
17.2%
Iran
64.2%
46.9%
Iraq
52.3%
46.0%
Egypt
46.7%
31.8%

Abortion is never justifiable
Men
Women
United States
24.4%
26.6%
Great Britain
20.2%
19.8%
Canada
25.0%
27.0%
Germany
15.0%
15.7%
France
12.8%
14.6%
Japan
15.2%
14.5%
Malaysia
40.7%
45.3%
Turkey
62.7%
61.6%
Iran
61.0%
61.6%
Iraq
83.6%
85.7%
Egypt
61.8%
50.9%

Turkey and Malaysia are considered religiously moderate Islamic countries, yet mainstream public sentiment on the items above (and on a whole host of other social issues) in these places are significantly to the right of the Republican party in the US, and of course public sentiment in more fervently Islamic countries like Iraq, Iran, and Egypt is more conservative still.

By way of example, the question on abortion is on a ten-point scale, with all but one of the possible responses allowing for abortion in at least some cases. The respective table above includes only the percentages of respondents who share Rick Santorum's view that it is never--even in the case of rape--justifiable for a woman to have an abortion. Throughout the Muslim Middle East and North Africa, majorities of both men and women feel the same way the "champion of the extreme anti-choice movement" in the US does.

The impression one gets from listening to major media organs in the US like NPR is that the putative rights of women are being squelched against their wishes. In reality, most women in Egypt don't want what the feminists in the West are selling. Four of five Egyptian women feel that men make better business executives than women do, and nine of ten feel the same way when it comes to political leaders. An overwhelming majority think that the workplace is a man's place before it is a woman's. Almost unanimously, single motherhood is censured. If a mainstream politician in the US were to express an opinion on any of these "women's rights" issues that most Egyptian women hold (and more power to them as far as I'm concerned--it's their country and their lives, not ours), it could easily spell the end of his political career.

WVS variables used: V44(1)(2-3), V59, V61, V62(1-2)(3-4), V63(1-2)(3-4), V204(1)(2-10), GENDER

Sunday, January 9, 2011

The implied guiltiness of mainstream celebrity conservatives like Sarah Palin for their 'incendiary' political rhetoric (ie, use of the verb "reload") in the Arizona shooting exposes a glaring double standard. I realize pointing out media double standards is about as novel and exciting as pointing out leftist SWPL bias on NPR, but this particular instance is so egregious that it's worth dwelling on for a moment.

The shooter's writings are inane, bordering on insane:
The population of dreamers in the United States of America is less than 5%!

If B.C.E. years are unable to start then A.D.E. years are unable to begin.

B.C.E. years are unable to start.

Thus, A.D.E. years are unable to begin. ...

You're a treasurer for a new currency, listener?

You create and distribute your new currency, listener?

You don't allow the government to control your grammar structure, listener? ...

All conscience dreaming at this moment is asleep. ...

If you call me a terrorist, then the argument to call me a terrorist is Ad hominem.

You call me a terrorist.

Thus, the argument to call me a terrorist is Ad hominem. ...

Read the United States of America's Constitution to apprehend all of the current treasonous laws. ...

I can't trust the current government because of the ratifications: The government is implying mind control and brainwash on the people by controlling grammar.

No, I won't pay debt in currency that's not backed by gold and silver!

No, I won't trust in God!
Everything else on his youtube page is similarly rambling and incoherent. If anything, he appears to be an anarchist. FBI director Robert Mueller has stated that the motives for the shooting are unknown as the investigation is barely a day old.

For the sake of argument, ignore all that uncertainty and assume Jared Loughner (the shooter) is exactly who the media establishment wants him to be. MSNBC, CNN (Wolf Blitzer), and FNC (Geraldo Rivera), all ran segments last night focusing on the putative anger against Democrats for Obamacare and opposition to Arizona's immigration bill as possible impetuses for the shooting, with guys like Blitzer and Al Sharpton suggesting that the criticism being directed at Democrats is inherently dangerous and should be toned down and oh by the way, if you share the critics' sentiments, you're probably a loose cannon with a trigger-happy finger.

Compare that to the shooting at Ft. Hood a little over a year ago. Were the same media figures questioning the inherent danger in political Islam, the cultural incompatibility of Islam and the secular West, or the prudence of allowing immigration into the US from majority Muslim countries (Hassan's parents were from Jordan)? Ha!

What we did get from the Ft. Hood shooting, though, is the argument that if we had not been in Afghanistan for a decade and Iraq nearly as long, if we hadn't had a military presence in Saudi Arabia up until the launching of the Iraq war, if weren't Israel's best friend, etc, perhaps Hassan would not have lit the place up. I think there's a good deal of truth to that.

So does the same line of thinking get consideration in the Arizona shooting--that if the 111th Congress had not passed a healthcare bill that the majority of the population didn't want, or if the federal government would enforce the nation's immigration laws, maybe random citizens wouldn't feel the need to gun down government officials? Ha!

Terrorist attacks and attempted terrorist attacks by guys like Hassan are far more frequent than similar actions by guys like Loughton, even though there are a lot more guys in the US who are like Loughton than are like Hassan. So it would seem logical for more thought to be put into what needs to be done to prevent future Ft. Hood shootings than what needs to be done to prevent future Tucson shootings, the former being one instance in a perennial pattern, the latter being an anomalous freak occurence. So it would seem, indeed.

Finally, another Jared, this one a man of upmost probity, and the New Century Foundation that he founded, are fingered for potentially having links to Loughner! If you want a refresher on what we're up against, read the whole article. If not, at least take note of Ingsoc's new field of academic study:
"When you look at Loughner's web posts, he puts himself out as half fantasy seeker and dreamer and half political philosopher, and American Renaissance, while a hate group, markets itself as a political philosophy organization," says Brian Levin, director of the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State University, at San Bernardino.

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Islam's media presence over time

In a Taki's Magazine column, John Derbyshire writes:
Plainly Islam was not, up to 1976, anywhere near the front of anyone’s mind in conservative intellectual circles.

The same was still true in 1986. By 1996, I think, there had been some modest awakening. Now, of course, we are all up to speed. Book-reading aside, the ordinary attentive reader of newspapers, magazines, and websites has taken in a million or so words on the topic of Islam this past few years. We all have our ideas now, though no doubt some are better-founded than others.
For as long as I've been paying attention to the world around me, a point in time that corresponded closely with 9/11, Islam has been a perennial media subject. But I'm aware that that coincidental timing will leave me with a skewed understanding of Islam's historical importance with regards to the country that is my home if I don't force a little perspective.

I assumed the war in Serbia, Desert Storm, the barracks bombing in Lebanon, the Iraq-Iran War, and the Iranian hostage crisis would cause spikes in attention paid to Islam, but figured 9/11 would dwarf them. Thanks to Agnostic, I have a handy method of quantifying (and improving) that generalized conception.

Utilizing the New York Times' online article archive, the following graph shows the number of articles containing at least one of the three words "Muslim", "Moslem", or "Islam" as a percentage of all articles written that year:

It's my understanding that Zionism was, in the late forties and fifties, largely an issue supported by the American left but over time lost its luster as the greatly outnumbered Israelis obliterated their Arab neighbors in every conceivable dimension--economic, political, cultural, military--causing the progressive David steadily morph into the imperialistic, merciless Goliath. So I'm surprised to see that the Muslim world was given so little media attention in Israel's early days, though it's also my impression that, prior to the sixties, the Establishment didn't much care about the world's backwaters. The American public presumably didn't either. Today, the difference is that the Establishment now clearly does care about the third world, though the public remains largely uninterested, as the Derb recently noted by pointing to Eastern Congo. In any case, throughout the fifties, fewer than 1 in 200 articles mentioned Muslims or their religion.

The 1973 oil crisis, putatively precipitated by the US' favoring of Israel in the Yom Kippur War, represents the first noticeable spike in coverage. The Iranian hostage crisis pushed Islam near the 1 in 50 articles range, a level it wouldn't return to until the onset of the Bosnian War more than a decade later. When the World Trade Centers were brought down, 1 in 35 articles mentioned Islam. It has fluctuated modestly year to year from that point since 2001, hitting its historical zenith in 2006 when the bloodletting in Iraq was at its worst.

Tangentially, it is at some point in late 1988 or early 1989 that "Moslem" is replaced with the contemporarily favored variant "Muslim". For the last couple of decades, "Moslem" has been a relic. I understand the change was a result of "Moslem" translating into something nasty in Arabic, while "Muslim" is quite flattering. I wonder if any readers are aware of where the push for what was apparently a very acute change came from. If so, please edify your humble host.

Saturday, February 20, 2010

Crusade calumnies

In Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt, Paul Gottfried excerpts (p62) from a speech given by Bill Clinton a couple of months after 9/11 as an illustration "exemplifying the power of multicultural concepts to influence political celebrities independently of tangible career interest" (that is, multicult worship is not merely a tool for achieving some desired political or social end, but has become an obligation on par with five-a-day prayer). Parts of the speech Gottfried elected not to quote, probably with space limitations in mind, strike me as more demonstrative than the ones he actually used. For example:

Look at you [Georgetown student body]. You are from everywhere. Look at us and you will see how more diverse America has grown in the last thirty-plus years. The terrorists killed people who came to America not to die, but dream, from every continent, from dozens of countries, most every religion on the face of the earth, including in large numbers Islam.
This paean to the putatively inherent value of racial and cultural diversity is ubiquitous in the political, educational, and business spheres of the modern West. The sacredness with which multiculturalism has been imbued is the subject of Gottfried's book. I found it to be too lacking in quantification and too orthogonal for my tastes, but that owes to my lack of enthusiasm for nuance and insinuation, not the professor's capabilities as a writer. Spare me the preamble and get to the point! That's advice I should follow more often than I do. So, on to the meat of this post.

The contemporary conventional description of the Crusades characterizes them as opportunistic, proto-colonialist undertakings, designed to plunder the wealth of a more advanced Arab world.

The colonial charge is risible. Crusading was extremely expensive. The first crusade was primarily funded privately, largely by those leading it. Godfrey of Bouillon, who would become the first ruler of the Kingdom of Jerusalem (KoJ), sold the entire county of Verdun to the king of France and still had to mortgage Boullion itself to finance his expedition. In God's Battalions, Rodney Stark reports that "a typical crusader needed to raise at least four or five times his annual income before he could set forth". The poor, who comprised much of Peter the Hermit's following, were a constant drain on crusading efforts and were vociferously discouraged from taking part by the papacy itself. Subsequent crusades were financed in large part through taxation, first on the clergy and then on the general public.

Further, there had never been any prospect of the Kingdom of Jerusalem becoming a source of revenue for Europe. Over the course of its nearly two-century existence, the kingdom was perpetually propped up by men, supplies, and massive financial transfers from Europe. If anything, Europe acted as a "colony" of the KoJ. The Templars, who rivaled the major Italian banking houses in their breadth, made money in Europe to spend on sustaining their fortified castles, knights, sergeants, and squires in the holy land. In fact, likely the first ever income tax in the West was levied on those in England and France to finance the third crusade--now that's a genuinely ugly legacy of the crusading period! Returning from King Louis IX's second (and fatal) crusade, King Edward I of England would be the last person to lead a significant crusading effort from Europe. Twenty years later, with largescale support from the continent having dried up, the KoJ was, quite literally, driven into the sea by Muslim forces--the kingdom's last remnant was the Templar's island fortress at Arwad, a couple of miles off the Syrian coast.

That the Islamic world was more advanced than that of Europe at the time is debatable (and beyond the scope of my historical knowledge). Certainly, though, European military technology was superior to that of the Arabs or Turks. Without the crossbow, it is almost impossible to imagine that the KoJ could have ever come into being. With a range of up to 200 yards for which men could become accurate in a matter of hours (whereas traditional longbows took years to master, both in required arm strength and aiming ability), crossbow bolts could pierce full plate armor. At a much closer range, Muslims arrows often became harmlessly stuck in Christian chain mail. The use of saddles and stirrups, combined with horses much larger than those ridden by Arabs and Turks, allowed European cavalry, equipped with lances, to charge with force sufficient to both impale and knock opponents off their horses at the same time. In contrast, sometimes riding without either, and often placing their stirrups further forward to allow a rider to sit while riding, many Muslim riders carried only carried swords and bows.

While the crusaders may have attributed their successes to the will of God, these advantages were crucial in delivering repeated crusader victories against larger, better provisioned Muslim forces fighting on their own soil.

Of course, the crusades were hardly unprovoked. Before Islam was born, Christendom existed throughout North Africa, most of western and southern Europe, and in what is now Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Turkey. A century after Muhammad died, Islam had conquered all of North Africa, most of the Middle East, and much of Spain. It would penetrate Europe all the way into France, reaching a high mark in 732 before the famous battle of Tours, when the Franks, led by Charles Martel, placed unmovable infantry lines in phalanx formation in front of Muslim cavalry. It proved deadly for the aggressors, who are thought to have been killed at rates as high as 10-to-1, despite outnumbering the Franks at something like 2-to-1.

When Urban II called for the first crusade at the Council of Claremont, it was in response to Byzantine emperor Alexius Commenus' plea for aid against the Seljuk Turks, who had made their capital Nicea, only 60 miles to the southeast of Constantinople. This came at a time when Christian pilgrims from both the Latin West and orthodox East were regularly robbed and harrassed by 'saracens', often fatally, on their way to Jerusalem.

The taking of Jerusalem during the first crusade is often used to epitomize the supposed ugliness that transpired for 200 years on account of the crusaders. Said Clinton:

First of all, terror, the killing of noncombatants for economic, political, or religious reasons has a very long history as long as organized combat itself, and yet, it has never succeeded as a military strategy standing on its own, but it has been around a long time. Those of us who come from various European lineages are not blameless. Indeed, in the first Crusade, when the Christian soldiers took Jerusalem, they first burned a synagogue with 300 Jews in it, and proceeded to kill every woman and child who was Muslim on the Temple mound. The contemporaneous descriptions of the event describe soldiers walking on the Temple mound, a holy place to Christians, with blood running up to their knees. I can tell you that that story is still being told to today in the Middle East and we are still paying for it.
The memory of the crusades did not exist in the Muslim world until the turn of the 20th Century, when the first Arab history of it was written. The Europeans were only one relatively minor group among many fighting for a stake in what has since come to be referred to as the Middle East. The 11th and 12th centuries are largely the story of expanding Turkish power in the Arab world and the competition between Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad to become and remain the cultural center of the Islamic world. Jerusalem wasn't that important, and the other coastal cities even less so, especially since control of the seas was dominated by Byzantium throughout the crusading period.

Indeed, when the first crusade arrived to take Jerusalem, a majority of the city's population was Christian. The Arab governor of the city expelled them when he became aware of the approaching crusader forces. It was a prudent move, as Antioch (which was also majority-Christian at the time) had a year earlier fallen from Fatimid (Muslim) hands in part because after Bohemond of Taranto bribed a sentinel into leaving a gate to the city unlocked and unguarded, crusader forces were joined by Christian residents of the city in battling Muslim forces in the streets.

Jews were represented among the Fatimid ranks defending Jerusalem from crusader forces. Undoubtedly, crusaders storming the city had seen their brothers in arms dispatched by the steel and arrows of Jerusalem's Jews. That the they--or the synagogue they retreated into--would have been accorded special treatment following the city's fall is a rather egregious imposition of contemporary sensibilities onto the medieval past.

Had the city surrendered, it is almost certain that no ensuing massacre would've occured. It was a standard rule of warfare at the time that if a scaling of the walls had to be attempted--inevitably resulting in the deaths of many executing the siege--due to the city holding out against its attackers, a cruel fate awaited those inside if the city was penetrated.

With word of an enormous Fatimid army coming from to Jerusalem's aid from Eygpt, the crusading camp was in a desperate situation. It was running low on food and potable water, and the intensifying summer heat continued to take a brutal toll on the crusaders (who were more heavily armored than the Muslims were). The crusaders had been travelling through hostile territory for more than two years with their ultimate objective finally at hand. Jerusalem's Muslim and Jewish inhabitants were threatening to have them annihilated by a large Eygptian army headed their way by refusing them entry to the city. So when Godfrey's forces took control of a section of the city's walls that allowed crusaders to mount the walls and take to streets, it's little wonder that Jerusalem's inhabitants would be made to pay.

The predictable fate of the city's residents is often juxtaposed to the relatively humane treatment the Jerusalem's Christian population would suffer when Saladin retook the city in 1187. Instead of being massacred, most of them were merely enslaved. But the city's Christian inhabitants, many of them refugees from other KoJ cities already fallen to the Ayyubids, surrendered rather than fight on. As Edward Gibbon, who shared the general disdain for the crusades that characterized the Enlightenment period, wrote in the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire:

Of some writeres it is a favourite and invidious theme to compare the humanity of Saladin with the massacre of the first crusade. The difference would be merely personal; but we should not forget that the Christians had offered to capitulate, and that the Mahometans of Jerusalem sustained the last extremeties of an assault and storm.
The image of Saladin as a paladin, sustained largely from the overtaking of Jerusalem (and maybe the way the two words rhyme?), is contradicted by the Kurd's* more typical (and again, understandable) brutality. After the battle of Hattin, he personally beheaded several captured members of the KoJ's military orders and happily allowed not only his soldiers but also imams and other Muslim religious practicioners to take part in the decapitations.

If historical objectivity is the aim, instances of the reverse occuring (which are as common, if not more so) should be similarly stressed. In 1153, for example, accompanied by both Hospitallers and Templars, Baldwin III took Ascalon after a surrender agreement allowing inhabitants to leave peaceably with their belongings was reached and carried out. More than a century later, the Mamluk Baibars, besieging a Templar castle in the Galilean uplands, proposed terms of surrender: Stop resisting and be allowed to withdraw without bodily harm to Acre. Upon opening the gates and surrendering the castle, Baibars had the entire Templar force beheaded.

That those of European ancestry should somehow carry on their shoulders a perpetual sense of guilt on account of the crusades typifies the mores of the "secular theocracy" of multiculturalism that Gottfried laments in his book. These are the same mores dictating that the slavery be thought of primarily as the act of white Europeans holding sub-Saharan Africans in bondage, despite slavery having existed throughout most of the world long before Europeans were capturing blacks, and having in fact likely been born in Africa only to be (mostly) extinguished on a global scale by northwestern Europeans. The crusades were military expeditions to reclaim land lost to Muslims over the preceding four centuries. Those undertaking them were believed to be divinely inspired, involved in pious undertakings for the good of Christians everywhere. They should not be anachronistically judged by Geneva convention standards, but viewed in context of those existing at the time.

* Today, Saladin keeps a relatively lower profile in the Arab world than he does in the Occident, presumably on account of his ethnicity.

Monday, January 4, 2010

Umar Mutallab and Nidal Hassan, the underwear bomber and Ft. Hood shooter, respectively, are two more recent, highly visible affirmations of former CIA officer Marc Sageman's finding that rather than coming from the dregs of society, international terrorists tend to be more educated and affluent than is most of the population in the countries they come from:
Most people think that terrorism comes from poverty, broken families, ignorance, immaturity, lack of family or occupational responsibilities, weak minds susceptible to brainwashing - the sociopath, the criminals, the religious fanatic, or, in this country, some believe they’re just plain evil.

Taking these perceived root causes in turn, three quarters of my sample came from the upper or middle class. The vast majority—90 percent—came from caring, intact families. Sixty-three percent had gone to college, as compared with the 5-6 percent that’s usual for the third world. These are the best and brightest of their societies in many ways.
Mutallab's father is a former bank executive and one of the richest men in Africa (though his father is not a villain--he warned the CIA that his son had cut off communication with him and was a potential threat). Mutallab was in college on his dad's dime. Hassan is a second-generation Palestinian who grew up in a Virginian middle class household where his parents owned a restaurant. These guys are not mired in destitute poverty, adopting 'extremist' views due to a lack of prospects for the future. Their comfortable lives are not exceptions to the rule--they are the rule.

Sageman also found that most (73%) were married, although Randall Parker and Dennis Mangan, among others, showcase compelling arguments that sexual frustration may play some role as well:
In Israel we have much experience with Arab suicide bombers and violent street mobs. One of the most effective remedies to the Intifada suicide attacks was to limit work permits in Israel to Palestinians over 40 and married. (That was improved upon by building a fence around Israel, which completely stopped that phenomenon). We cannot stop them coming to pray in the Jerusalem Al Aqsa Mosque, and every Friday prayer used to end in bloody confrontations with the police.

So now, when the Arab street gets excited, Israel allows the entrance of only people over 40 and married. About 50% of the Palestinian girls are married by the age of 18, while men usually have to build their house to marry, which is around 30. Marriage is generally an exchange = you have to supply your sister in esxchange for a bride. That's why "honour killings" are so common - if the sister does not agree, she "brings shame on the family" and the brother cannot marry. Whores are killed by the "morality police". The consequence is that sexual perversion (goats?) and murderous acts of running amok are quite common in the Arab society, but who cares? They are never reported not here nor in the USA which is OK. I am sure if Major Hassan had been married he would have reacted with less violence.
An assessment similar to the the one done by Sageman based on more recent terrorist profiles would surely be informative.

Parenthetically, the contemporary stigma surrounding men who are sexually frustrated is such that serious discourse on the subject rarely takes place. It is almost inconceivable in contemporary Western society that a well-off, healthy guy with a moderately prestigious occupation whose agoraphobic social awkwardness has left him sexually frustrated could be seen as more deserving of sympathetic pity than a chronically unemployed, uneducated cad who's been in and out of jail. The former is a loser deserving of ridicule while the latter is to be coddled and cared about, despite the fact that the burgher who can't get laid does a lot more good for society than the prolish thug who can't hold a job does. Yet for most people sexual fulfillment is one of the three most important elements (health and wealth being the other two) necessary for realizing contented happiness.
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